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Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as 
‘cognitive access’? The dominant methodology for supporting this independence 
hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual 
consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential 
support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article 
argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the 
independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject’s partial report is evidence 
that she is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. 
So partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only 
if there were uncontroversial evidence for consciousness which did not imply 
reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology 
for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it 
outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for 
consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead it focuses on a function of 
perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best 
suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence 
hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected 
in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject’s behaviour. 
 
 
1. Consciousness, cognitive access and the NCC 
 Various theories of consciousness can be loosely grouped together as claiming 
that consciousness requires cognitive access [1]. ‘Cognitive access’ is a broad, vague 
term, but useful for framing the problems discussed here. It includes various processes 
that make information available for general purposes. For instance, cognitive access 
does not occur just insofar as the visual system processes information about a scene; 
cognitive access occurs when some of that information is made available for a range of 
purposes, such as verbal report, action planning, explicit reasoning and long-term 
mapping of the environment. So this group of theories includes, among others, theories 
that: consciousness consists in information’s being broadcast by a system with 
widespread influence around the brain [2,3]; consciousness consists in a certain kind of 
thought about a mental representation [4]; consciousness occurs if and only if perceptual 
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representations of a certain kind are made available to working memory by attention 
[5].1 
These are all theories of what makes the difference between processing 
information non-consciously and being conscious of that information. Call the 
hypothesis that cognitive access to information is always what makes the difference 
between processing information non-consciously and being conscious of that 
information ‘the Cognitive Hypothesis’ (CH). Contrast this with theories according to 
which visual consciousness occurs when certain specifically visual processes occur, 
whether or not the visually processed information is available for general purposes 
[1,6,8]. According to those theories, cognitive access to information is not required for 
consciousness of that information. 
 This dispute can also be cast in neural, rather than functional, terms. According 
to CH, no episodes within visual cortex are sufficient for consciousness; consciousness 
requires projections into further mechanisms such as working memory. According to 
theories in the opposed group, certain episodes within visual cortex are sufficient for 
consciousness; for example recurrent processing—roughly, feedback loops between 
later and earlier areas—in visual cortex is sufficient for consciousness [6]. So this is a 
dispute about the neural correlates of consciousness (the NCC). 
The theories in both groups are motivated by conceptual, introspective and 
empirical arguments. Here we are concerned only with the empirical argument against 
CH, though §5 and §6 explain some connections with introspective and conceptual 
arguments. Any empirical argument for or against CH faces a deep problem [1,9]. In 
controversial cases, a subject’s report of information is our only universally accepted 
evidence that she is conscious of that information.2 Reports are ill placed to help us 																																																								1	The claim that consciousness requires attention belongs to this group only if ‘attention’ is 
restricted to processes that make information available for general purposes [5,6]. Some early 
visual processes that meet the standard Posner criteria for attention do not satisfy this restriction 
[7].	2	Different theorists emphasise different kinds of report [10], e.g. reporting confidence about 
stimuli, reporting stimulus visibility, or simply reporting stimuli themselves. Reports need not 
be verbal: actions such as unprompted grasping or pointing may constitute report. Other kinds 
of evidence for consciousness have been proposed, for example in ‘no-report paradigms’ [11], 
but they are controversial for reasons given in what follows. 
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assess CH, because whether or not consciousness requires cognitive access, reports 
require cognitive access: when you are in a position to report information, that 
information is also available for a range of other purposes. So reports are equally 
consistent with CH and its denial, as are failures to report. 
The problem is not simply that our initial, everyday ways of recognising 
consciousness cannot provide evidence for or against CH. Our famously poor grasp of 
how physiology and information processing could explain consciousness [12,13] is a bar 
to moving beyond the initial ways of recognising consciousness and finding other 
uncontroversial ways of recognising it. Compare consciousness with information 
processing in this respect. Our initial way of recognising that an organism processes 
information typically lies in its success in navigating its environment. This does not 
enable us to distinguish the organism’s information-processing systems from other 
systems, such as the bloodstream. But we can move beyond our initial way of 
recognising information processing to develop independent ways of identifying it. For 
instance, Kuffler recognised that the centre/surround structure of retinal ganglia is 
suitable to explain processing of information about the locations of objects’ edges [14]. 
By contrast, because we have a poor grasp of how a physical system could explain 
consciousness, any non-report-based evidence for consciousness is controversial. 
This article criticises a dominant methodology for arguing against CH. The 
methodology uses partial report experiments as evidence for the contrary hypothesis 
that perceptual consciousness ‘overflows’ cognitive access, in the sense that subjects are 
perceptually conscious of more information than is cognitively accessed [1,6,8,15-18]. 
Call this ‘the Overflow Hypothesis’ (OH). Previous work has objected that the results of 
partial report experiments are compatible with CH [9,19-23]. However, this objection 
leaves open the possibility that the evidence from partial report is a non-decisive reason 
for preferring OH to CH. For example, Ned Block responds that “if … we adopt the 
methodology of asking which hypothesis is better supported … we should prefer the 
overflow hypothesis” [16]. 
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To assess whether partial report provides such support for OH, we can 
understand evidential support in the following standard way [24]. Data support a 
hypothesis if and only if the probability of the hypothesis, conditional on the data, is 
higher than the unconditional probability of the hypothesis. Conversely, data 
undermine a hypothesis if and only if the probability of the hypothesis, conditional on 
the data, is lower than the unconditional probability of the hypothesis. Finally, a 
hypothesis is overall well supported, given some data, to the extent to which the 
hypothesis is probable conditional on the data. So we can model Block’s claim as 
follows, where the unconditional probability of each Hypothesis is the same: 
conditional on the data from partial report, OH is more probable than CH. For short: 
P(OH|D) > P(CH|D). Nothing substantive turns on this model, but it will make some 
distinctions clear.3 
We shall see that the evidence from partial report fails to provide such support 
for OH, because the partial report paradigm has the wrong structure to circumvent the 
deep problem described above. A different methodology will be suggested. 
 
2. Partial report 
 
Figure 1 
 
From Sligte et al. 2009 [32], by permission of Ilja Sligte and the Journal of Neuroscience. 
 																																																								3	Block’s claim is modelled in terms of absolute, rather than incremental, confirmation. That is 
one way (though not the only way) to capture the question of which hypothesis is best supported 
overall, conditional on the data from partial report. 
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In a series of experiments, Victor Lamme’s group at the University of 
Amsterdam have elaborated the partial report paradigm devised by George Sperling 
[25]. An array of items (e.g. rectangles) is presented, followed by a blank screen, then a 
second array of items at the same locations (Figure 1). The task is to report whether an 
item in the second array differs (e.g. in orientation) from its corresponding item in the 
first. A line cues the relevant item. In retro-cue trials, this cue appears during 
presentation of the blank screen, up to four seconds after the first array and before the 
second. In post-cue trials, the cue appears simultaneously with the second array. 
Subjects perform better in retro-cue than in post-cue trials. Performance suggests 
that, upon post-cuing, enough information for success in the task is available with 
respect to no more than four items in the first array; upon retro-cuing, enough 
information for success is available with respect to almost every item—exactly how 
many items depends on the stimuli presented and the timing of the retro-cue [26]. 
This is explained as follows [27]. Detailed information about almost every item 
in the array is processed by the visual system, and persists after offset of the array. So 
after offset, retro-cuing enables subjects to access detailed information about whichever 
item in the first array is cued. Subjects can then exploit that information to detect 
whether the corresponding item in the second array differs. Post-cuing, by contrast, 
comes too late to assist subjects in this way, because when the second array appears 
visual information about it overwrites visual information about the first array. As a 
result, in post-cue trials subjects have to rely on the limited capacity of working 
memory, rather than the broader capacity of specifically visual processing, to retain 
information about the first array. 	 For the sake of argument, this explanation of the results is accepted in what 
follows.4 Note that it says nothing about consciousness. So explained, the results are 
evidence that, after offset of the first array, detailed information about almost every item 
																																																								4	Gross and Flombaum [28] argue that the results do not support OH, since they are explained 
by effects on probabilistic computations which do not involve a drop in capacity between visual 
processing and working memory. The argument in what follows is that the results do not 
support OH over CH even if they are explained by such a drop in capacity. 
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persists in visual system, while detailed information about ≤4 items reaches working 
memory and cognitive access. 
 Lamme, Block and others make the further claim that subjects are conscious of 
the detailed information about almost every item which persists in the visual system 
(OH) [1,6,15-18]. By contrast according to CH, subjects are conscious only of the 
information that is cognitively accessed, which includes detailed information about ≤4 
items. 
Each of these two interpretations is a straightforward prediction of the 
corresponding Hypothesis. OH predicts that subjects are visually conscious of 
information that does not reach cognitive access. CH predicts that the visual system 
processes information only non-consciously, where that information does not reach 
cognitive access. To support OH over CH, we would need to identify something that 
makes overflow the more probable interpretation, conditional on prior probabilities that 
are neutral between OH and CH. 
 The two interpretations are identical with respect to the structure of the 
information-processing hierarchy, and with respect to the level of detail processed at 
each stage. On both interpretations, visually processed information about almost every 
item is detailed enough for success in the task, while cognitively accessed information 
is partial in the following sense: this information is detailed enough for success in the 
task with respect to ≤4 items, and at best less detailed with respect to the remaining 
items. The interpretations differ only on the question of which processing stage 
correlates with consciousness. 
Wayne Wu criticises the idea that subjects are conscious only of partial 
information on the grounds that this requires a “decay of information” not required by 
OH [29]. Wu argues that this commitment to a prima facie “pointless step” in the 
processing places an explanatory burden on CH. If this were correct, it would be true 
that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D). But in fact the interpretations predicted by CH and OH 
involve the same decay of information: that between visual processing and the lower-
capacity processes of cognitive access. Similarly, Block criticises the idea that subjects 
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are conscious only of non-detailed information about items outside the focus of 
attention, on the grounds that inattention does not make early-visual responses less 
precise [17,30]. But CH and OH both predict that the loss of detailed information occurs 
at the stage of cognitive access, not in early vision. 
Given this common ground between the two interpretations, any support for 
one interpretation over the other must concern consciousness in particular, rather than 
descriptions of the information processing which make no essential reference to 
consciousness. 
One difference between the interpretations concerns how consciousness in the 
experiments unfolds over time. According to the overflow interpretation, retro-cuing 
facilitates cognitive access to detailed information about whichever item is cued, 
because subjects are already conscious of that detailed information before retro-cuing. 
That is, the overflow interpretation assumes that in retro-cue trials consciousness of the 
first array is cue-independent. One alternative consistent with CH is a postdictive effect 
such that all consciousness of the retro-cued item depends on the cue [20]. This 
alternative may be supported by evidence of postdictive effects on stimulus visibility 
even at the stimulus-cue asynchrony of 4s used in some of the Amsterdam experiments 
[31]. 
However, CH does not require that all consciousness of the retro-cued item 
depends on the cue. CH just requires that retro-cuing changes the information of which 
subjects are conscious in the same way as retro-cuing changes the information 
cognitively accessed. More specifically, retro-cuing of an item induces cognitive access 
to detailed information about that item; this involves a change in the information 
cognitively accessed by any subject who did not happen to cognitively access detailed 
information about that item before cuing. The overflow interpretation requires no such 
change in the information of which subjects are conscious. However, it requires exactly 
the same change in the information cognitively accessed. Since subjects report only 
cognitively accessed information, the two interpretations make identical predictions 
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about how the change affects partial reports: in the time available, detailed information 
about ≤4 items is cognitively accessed and so reported. 
This problem is an instance of the more general problem facing attempts to use 
partial reports to support OH over CH. OH and CH agree that subjects are conscious of 
the partial information that is reported; the disagreement concerns unreported 
information. This common ground between OH and CH is not always recognised, so 
consider it in more detail next. 
 
3. Consciousness explains partial reports 
To cast doubt on OH, Ian Phillips notes that the Amsterdam task is two-
alternative forced choice (report whether or not the cued item differs): 
 
Two-alternative forced choice tasks notoriously over-estimate conscious 
experience. Information which does not correlate with consciously experienced 
features is often picked up by the perceptual system and encoded in implicit 
memory (witness priming effects well-attested across a wide range of 
paradigms). This information can exert an impressive influence on behavioural 
responses in forced-choice tasks despite absence of awareness. Thus, to establish 
an overflow interpretation of the results … we need to establish that responses 
reflect explicit conscious comparison of the two arrays as opposed to a form of 
non-conscious priming. [20] 
 
According to this priming-based alternative to overflow, subjects are not conscious of 
the information reflected in their partial reports. 
Bronfman et al. [8] combined partial report with visibility ratings, to provide 
evidence that partial reports do reflect consciousness. They presented a 4x6 array of 
variously coloured letters. A pre-cue before onset indicated one row. A retro-cue 
indicated one letter in the same row. The task was first to report the retro-cued letter, 
then to report either high or low colour diversity in a certain row. High diversity 
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corresponds to colours spanning the entire colour wheel, low diversity to colours 
spanning just under one third of the wheel. 
A colour-diversity task was used because “without a differentiated … 
representation of the colors, it is not possible to judge diversity” [8]. This representation 
was dissociated from cognitive access as follows. Reports of the retro-cued letter show 
that subjects retained letter-identifying information about 3 letters in the pre-cued row 
on average. So cognitive access was focussed on the pre-cued row. Furthermore, 
subjects reported a row’s colour diversity equally accurately when it was the pre-cued 
row (69% success) and when it was not (66%). This suggests that colour-diversity 
reports did not depend on cognitive access to detailed information about individual 
items’ colours, since that would predict a greater interaction between accuracy and the 
focus of cognitive access. So we have evidence that only the partial information 
immediately involved in colour-diversity judgements reached cognitive access. 
In a further experiment, subjects were given the colour-diversity task but not the 
letter-identification task. In addition, masking was used to reduce the array’s visibility, 
and subjects rated visibility. Ratings correlated with performance: ‘did not see the 
colors’ with 47% success; ‘partially saw the colors’ with 68%; ‘saw the colors well’ with 
84%. This is evidence that subjects’ accurate partial reports about colour diversity are 
explained by consciousness of information about the array, rather than by non-
conscious priming. 
However, CH does not predict that accurate partial reports are explained by 
non-conscious priming. CH predicts that subjects are not conscious of information only 
where that information is not cognitively accessed. If the reported information about 
colour diversity is cognitively accessed, CH predicts that subjects are conscious of it. CH 
predicts only that subjects are not conscious of the underlying detailed information 
about individual letters’ colours. 
Against CH, Bronfman et al. claim that subjects are conscious of the underlying 
detailed information. But this is not supported by the evidence that subjects exploit “a 
differentiated … representation of the colors”. The issue between OH and CH is 
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precisely whether such representations, which are independent of cognitive access, 
constitute consciousness or non-conscious information processing [21]. Nor is CH 
undermined by the visibility ratings. According to CH, subjects are conscious only of 
partial information when task demands ensure that only this partial information is 
cognitively accessed. Subjects said they ‘partially saw the colors’ when performance 
(68%) was similar to performance in the experiments which loaded cognitive access 
with the letter-identification task (66-69%). So CH predicts the visibility ratings. 
In these experiments, as in the Amsterdam experiments, reports are evidence 
that subjects are conscious of partial information about the array, but they are not 
evidence that subjects are conscious of the further information that is visually processed. 
Both Hypotheses predict that subjects are conscious of the partial information. The 
dispute concerns whether subjects are conscious of the further information. Therefore, 
where the data are subjects’ partial reports, P(OH|D) = P(CH|D). 
Some discussions and elaborations of the partial report paradigm attempt to 
identify non-report-based evidence that subjects are conscious of information which is 
not cognitively accessed. As we will see next, these attempts fail to support OH over 
CH, conditional on prior probabilities that are neutral between OH and CH. 
 
4. Non-report-based evidence for consciousness? 
Different forms of visual processing are at work in different partial report 
experiments, depending on the stimulus-cue asynchrony [26]. The system probed by 
retro-cues at an asynchrony of >1s is dubbed fragile Visual Short Term Memory (fragile 
VSTM). In the experiment depicted in Figure 1, fMRI analysis suggested that fragile 
VSTM is based in area V4 of visual cortex, rather than in earlier processes at the retina, 
V1, V2 or V3 [32]. Block claims that this evidence “argues against highly detailed 
unconscious representations” of the kind required by CH, “since early visual areas 
would be the most obvious candidates for their locations” [16]. 
Block’s argument can be reconstructed as follows. Detailed unconscious 
representations are probable in early visual areas, but improbable in V4. Given the fMRI 
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evidence, CH locates detailed unconscious representations in V4, so the fMRI evidence 
undermines CH: P(CH|D) < P(CH).  
To assess this argument, consider why detailed unconscious representations 
may be thought improbable in V4. The information processed in early visual areas is a 
poor match for the information of which one is visually conscious. For example, the 
information of which one is visually conscious is subject to constancy effects not yet at 
work in V1 [33]. That makes it probable that representations in early visual areas are 
unconscious. But why should this, in turn, make it improbable that representations in 
V4 are unconscious? The only available reasoning seems to be that, if the neural 
correlates of visual consciousness lie somewhere in visual cortex, they probably lie in 
later areas such as V4. As the antecedent of this conditional makes clear, it does not 
undermine CH conditional on prior probabilities that are neutral between CH and OH. 
The case against unconscious representations in V4 is conditional on an assumption 
which is already inconsistent with CH—the assumption that the neural correlates of 
visual consciousness lie somewhere in visual cortex. 
In fact, CH predicts that later visual areas such as V4 will process the detailed 
information that supports performance in partial report tasks. CH is the hypothesis that 
cognitive access to information is what makes the difference between processing 
information non-consciously and being conscious of that information. Aside from a 
possible role in criterion setting [34], the mechanisms of cognitive access are unsuitable 
for the further task of extracting information about distal stimuli from proximal visual 
stimulation. So the most probable possibility consistent with CH is that visual areas 
extract this information, while cognitive access just makes this information available for 
general purposes, which—by hypothesis—makes subjects conscious of it. Therefore, 
given that information processed in early visual areas is a poor match for the 
information of which one is conscious, CH predicts that later visual areas such as V4 
will process the very information of which one is conscious. 
Evidence that detailed information is processed in V4 does not, then, entail that 
P(OH|D) > P(CH|D). Turn now to a different kind of attempt to find such support for 
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OH, which focuses on the character of representations in fragile VSTM, and in particular 
on evidence that they are governed by principles of perceptual grouping. 
 
Figure 2  
 
From Vandenbroucke et al. 2012 [18], by permission of Annelinde Vandenbroucke and PLoS One. 
   
In a Kanizsa figure, shapes are arranged such that the visual system interprets a 
group of them as including an illusory contour [35]. For example, in Figure 2A a black 
triangle is apparent among or in front of the white shapes. In virtue of this effect, it is 
sometimes easier to remember the orientations of shapes which form a Kanizsa figure 
than to remember the orientations of shapes which do not (Figure 2B). 
Vandenbroucke et al. [18] used a Kanizsa figure as each item in the arrays of the 
Amsterdam paradigm. Performance was better with Kanizsa figures than with controls. 
Moreover, when the asynchrony between the first array and the retro-cue was >1s, the 
advantage of Kanizsa figures over controls was greater with a retro-cue than with a 
post-cue. This suggests that Kanizsa grouping is produced in fragile VSTM rather than 
working memory. 
Vandenbroucke et al. claim that their findings “suggest that the representations 
underlying sensory memory are phenomenological”, i.e. conscious, independently of 
cognitively access. To assess this, consider two different assumptions: 
 
(i) If fragile VSTM is a neural correlate of visual consciousness, fragile VSTM 
probably exhibits perceptual grouping effects. 
(ii) If fragile VSTM exhibits perceptual grouping effects, fragile VSTM is probably a 
neural correlate of visual consciousness. 
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Assumption (i) is fairly uncontroversial. Since visual consciousness exhibits 
perceptual grouping effects, we should expect the neural correlates of visual 
consciousness to exhibit them. By (i), OH predicts perceptual grouping effects in fragile 
VSTM. So Vandenbroucke et al.’s findings support OH: P(OH|D) > P(OH). However, 
their findings also support CH: P(CH|D) > P(CH).5 As we saw above, the most probable 
possibility consistent with CH is that visual areas extract information about distal 
stimuli from proximal visual stimulation, while cognitive access just makes this 
information available for general purposes, which—by hypothesis—makes subjects 
conscious of it. Perceptual grouping is one aspect of how information about distal 
stimuli is extracted from proximal visual stimulation, so CH predicts that this will occur 
in visual areas. Since the findings support each Hypothesis in these ways, they do not 
entail that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D) conditional on (i). 
Conditional on assumption (ii), the findings do entail that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D): 
they make it probable that fragile VSTM is a neural correlate of consciousness, and 
correspondingly improbable that consciousness requires cognitive access. But why 
accept (ii)? Vandenbroucke et al.’s discussion suggests a motivation for doing so. They 
associate unconscious representation with ‘fragmented’ representation, and conscious 
representation with ‘integrated’ representation: 
 
It is highly debated whether sensory memory representations are fragmented 
and unconscious or whether they are … phenomenally conscious. … Sensory 
memory does not merely entail simple features—such as orientation—that can 
also be represented unconsciously, but consists of higher-level integrated 
representations with a phenomenological basis. [18] 6 
																																																								5	Data may support both OH and CH, since OH and CH are exclusive but not exhaustive: as the 
history of philosophy and psychology testifies, other theories about the mechanisms of 
consciousness are logically possible.	6	This is a response to, inter alia, Kouider et al.’s proposal that fragile VSTM representations are 
unconscious and represent fragments of unattended items in the array [36]. That proposal is 
neither required nor predicted by CH (see §2). As evidence that the Kanizsa effect requires 
consciousness, Vandenbroucke et al. also mention experiments which obliterated the effect 
through continuous flash suppression of the inducers [37]. This evidence is equivocal [21]. 
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However, the fact that a representation is ‘integrated’ by perceptual grouping is not 
evidence that it is a conscious representation, conditional on prior probabilities that are 
neutral between the CH and OH. To see this, distinguish two forms of unity in 
consciousness [38]. Perceptual grouping is one, distinctively perceptual, form of unity: 
a group of items is represented as a unified or integrated scene; for example contours 
formed by the edges of several items are visible. CH is sometimes motivated by the 
claim that a distinct, global form of unity is a mark of consciousness: information of 
which one is conscious is unified, in the sense that all the information of which one is 
conscious at a time can be exploited together [2,3]. Since these are distinct forms of unity, 
the claim that global unity is a mark of consciousness incurs no commitment to the claim 
that perceptual unity is a mark of consciousness. In fact, to make assumption (ii) is 
already to assume, against CH, that what makes the difference between consciousness 
and non-conscious information processing is perceptual, rather than the general-
purpose mechanisms of cognitive access. 
 Vandenbroucke et al. qualify their interpretation in a way that sets out the 
methodology of Lamme’s group: 
 
Obviously, to warrant the conclusion that sensory memory holds items in a fully 
perceptual or even conscious status would require more evidence. Many 
dimensions of perceptual quality would have to be compared between sensory 
memory and unequivocally conscious representations, either psychophysically 
or using neuroimaging techniques. Only when sensory and attended or accessed 
representations are similar in many or all perceptual dimensions the conclusion 
is warranted that sensory memory is a remnant of conscious vision. [18] 
 
The methodology is to identify many “dimensions of perceptual quality” which, like 
perceptual grouping, characterise both fragile-VSTM representations and clear cases of 
consciousness. This methodology will not find evidence such that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D), 
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conditional on prior probabilities that are neutral between OH and CH. Again, 
distinguish two assumptions: 
 
(1) If fragile VSTM is a neural correlate of visual consciousness, fragile VSTM probably 
exhibits perceptual qualities Q1 … Qn. 
(2) If fragile VSTM exhibits perceptual qualities Q1 … Qn, fragile VSTM is probably a 
neural correlate of visual consciousness. 
 
Assumption (1) is fairly uncontroversial, and by (1) OH predicts perceptual 
qualities Q1 … Qn in fragile VSTM. So the discovery of such qualities in fragile VSTM 
would support OH. But the discovery of such qualities in fragile VSTM would also 
support CH. For CH predicts that visual areas will extract information about distal 
stimuli from proximal visual stimulation in ways that exhibit the distinctively 
perceptual aspects of perceptual consciousness, while cognitive access just makes the 
results available for general purposes and so aspects of consciousness.  
Conditional on assumption (2), the discovery of perceptual qualities Q1 … Qn 
in fragile VSTM would entail that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D). But to assume (2) is already to 
assume, against CH, that one mechanism probably plays two distinct explanatory roles: 
on the one hand, explaining the distinctively perceptual aspects of perceptual 
consciousness; on the other hand, making the difference between non-consciously 
processing information and being conscious of that information. CH is precisely the 
hypothesis that distinct mechanisms play these distinct roles.  
 As we saw in §3, where the data are partial reports, P(OH|D) = P(CH|D). We 
have now seen two arguments—from fMRI evidence and perceptual quality—which 
seek non-report-based evidence that subjects are conscious of information which is not 
cognitively accessed. The arguments fail because there is no such evidence, conditional 
on prior probabilities that are neutral between OH and CH. The evidence remains such 
that P(OH|D) = P(CH|D). Turn now to a different attempt to find evidence for 
consciousness beyond subjects’ partial reports. This approach starts with the partial 
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reports themselves, and exploits an assumption about the specificity of consciousness 
to infer from them that subjects are conscious of more than they report or cognitively 
access. 
 
5. The specificity of consciousness 
Subjects’ formally measured partial reports concern only the ≤4 items about 
which cognitively accessed information is specific enough for success in the task. Block 
adds a further, informal element: “subjects said that they could see all or almost all” the 
items in the array [1,2]. 
Some defenders of CH cast such reports as the product of introspective illusions 
[3,36]. If CH required introspective illusions, this might be an explanatory burden such 
that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D). But CH requires no introspective illusions, even if Block’s 
account of the reports is correct. Accept, for the sake of argument, that where the task is 
to report whether there is a difference in the orientation of a rectangle (Figure 1), subjects 
accurately report seeing every rectangle. 
Block takes the reports to show that, for each rectangle, the subject is conscious 
that it is a non-square rectangle [16]. Let us agree that a subject reports seeing a rectangle 
only if she is conscious that it is a non-square rectangle. Since this information is 
reported, it is cognitively accessed. So the information cognitively accessed is as follows: 
for each rectangle, information that it is a non-square rectangle; for ≤4 rectangles, 
enough specific information about orientation for success in the task; for the remaining 
rectangles, less specific information about orientation.7 
CH requires that this is also the information of which subjects are conscious. 
Block objects that “generic conscious representations of non-square rectangles that do 
																																																								
7 By Block’s own lights, then, his suggestion that cognitive access “has a capacity of about 4 
items” [1] must refer only to the capacity to process detailed information about an item. This is 
consistent with recent models of working memory which do not give its capacity simply in terms 
of a number of items [39]. 
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not specify between horizontal and vertical orientations is difficult to accept” [16].8 That 
is, he assumes support for the following principle: 
 
Specificity If one is visually conscious that an item is a non-square rectangle, one is 
also visually conscious of more specific information about its orientation. 
 
If Specificity is to undermine CH, Specificity must include cases in which the more 
specific information about orientation is not cognitively accessed. So understood, 
Specificity entails OH and contradicts CH. Therefore we have already seen the following, 
where prior probabilities are neutral between OH and CH: any support for Specificity 
must concern consciousness in particular, rather than descriptions of information 
processing which make no essential reference to consciousness (§2); reports about 
stimuli do not support Specificity, since they reflect only cognitively accessed 
information about stimuli (§3), yet any support for Specificity must be report-based (§4). 
So any support for Specificity must lie not in the results of partial report experiments, 
but in a particular kind of introspective report: a report which provides evidence that 
one is conscious of specific information about a stimulus, but which does not depend 
on cognitive access to that specific information. 
On one influential model of introspection, such an introspective report is 
impossible, because you introspect perceptual states by cognitively accessing the 
information about stimuli which those states make available [40]. Support for Specificity 
requires a different model, such that you can introspect that you are conscious of specific 
information about a rectangle’s orientation without cognitively accessing that 
information. For example, one might hold that introspective reports reflect cognitive 
access to information about properties of conscious perception which in turn carry 
																																																								8	 Block’s 2007 characterisation of what CH requires was more restrictive: “a phenomenal 
presentation that there is a circle of rectangles” [1]. Such a presentation, which does not involve 
seeing each item, is not required by CH. See Stazicker 2011 [9] for criticism of this restriction, and 
of Block’s related claim that CH requires a dramatic change from generic to specific 
consciousness which subjects could be expected to report.	
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information about the environment. On this model, introspecting a perceptual state is 
analogous to seeing that a tree has rings which carry specific information about its age; 
you can do this without seeing how many rings there are or what the specific age is. 
For present purposes, we need not settle whether such an introspective report is 
possible, nor whether it could provide reliable evidence.9 Suppose there is introspective 
support for Specificity. If so, P(OH|D) > P(CH|D) where the data are purely 
introspective. The partial report experiments are irrelevant. As we have seen, the 
experimental results do not support Specificity. Nor do the experiments add 
complementary evidence for OH and against CH, such that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D) where 
the data are the experimental results together with the introspective evidence. For as we 
have seen, without the introspective evidence, P(OH|D) = P(CH|D). So with or without 
the introspective evidence, the experiments do not provide evidence such that P(OH|D) 
> P(CH|D). 
 
6. An alternative methodology? 
Partial report is a fruitful paradigm. Conditional on OH, the experiments isolate 
a neural correlate of consciousness in fragile VSTM, and provide important evidence 
about its character and function. However, the paradigm has the wrong structure to 
establish that P(OH|D) > P(CH|D). Conditional on prior probabilities neutral between 
OH and CH, the experiments provide evidence only that subjects are conscious of the 
partial information which is cognitively accessed. 
This is one instance of a more general problem with seeking experimental 
evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access: reports are our only 
uncontroversial evidence of consciousness, and reported information is cognitively 
accessed. So on the face of it we need a methodology which does not require such 
evidence, if CH is to be critically assessed on empirical grounds. 
																																																								9	See Spener 2007 [41] for doubts about reliability. 
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Following David Marr [42], a standard methodology for investigating a 
psychological system is to identify a function of the system, an algorithm that could 
compute the function, and physiological processes suitable to implement the algorithm. 
This does not require evidence that the function is performed in the absence of its 
downstream effects. For example, it was possible for Kuffler to identify the function of 
edge detection, and argue that ganglia are suitable to implement an algorithm that 
computes this function, without experimental evidence of edge detection in the absence 
of downstream effects such as object perception [14]. A similar approach to critically 
assessing CH would not seek evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive 
access; it would identify a function of consciousness, and assess whether the 
mechanisms most suitable to implement that function include those of cognitive access. 
One set of obstacles to this approach lies in identifying a suitable function of 
consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is sometimes said to have no function 
[43]. On the other hand, where consciousness is treated as having a function, CH is 
stipulated from the outset. For example some defenders of CH assume, in effect, that 
the function of perceptual consciousness takes perceptual information as input and 
delivers reportability as output [3]. This stipulates CH because by assumption, the 
function of perceptual consciousness includes a function of cognitive access, namely the 
kind of general-purpose availability of information required for report [1]. If CH is to 
be critically assessed, we need a more fine-grained account of the function of perceptual 
consciousness which neither assumes nor denies CH, but which is consistent with the 
starting-point that evidence for consciousness is report-based. 
Articulating and defending such an account would involve tackling a range of 
broadly-speaking conceptual questions about consciousness, thought and action—a 
substantial project beyond our scope here. But to illustrate one example of a possible 
direction this could take, consider a study of consciousness in which it is initially unclear 
whether a response is a report. 
In Adrian Owen and colleagues’ famous work with outwardly unresponsive 
patients who meet the criteria for vegetative state, Monti et al. [44] asked patients to 
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imagine playing tennis, then to imagine walking around their homes. Several 
responded with neural activity that is correlated in healthy subjects with consciously 
imagining these actions (in Sensory Motor Area and Parahippocampal Place Area 
respectively). Perhaps this could be cast as a non-conscious priming effect, but a further 
experiment seems to confirm that, in some patients, responses of this kind are reports 
and reflect consciousness. Patients who responded as above were instructed to imagine 
playing tennis in order to answer ‘yes’, and to imagine walking around the house in 
order to answer ‘no’, in response to questions such as ‘Do you have any brothers?’ One 
patient’s responses corresponded to correct answers. 
 Why is it so compelling that this patient was conscious? Monti et al. suggest a 
natural answer, characterising her responses as “willful” communication. On the face 
of it at least, the fact that the responses corresponded to correct answers can be 
explained only if they were intentional actions, reflecting a decision made on the basis 
of the instructions and questions. That is evidence that the patient was conscious, insofar 
as decisions of this kind require consciousness of the basis for action.  
 The suggestion that decisions of this kind require consciousness can be fleshed 
out using some ideas from the philosophical literature. Intentional action is often 
understood as action for reasons [45]. For instance the instructions and the question are 
among the patient’s reasons for imagining playing tennis. A growing body of work 
explores the idea that one has a reason or rational basis for certain thoughts (perceptual 
demonstratives, such as those expressed by saying ‘that person’ or ‘that instruction’) 
only if one consciously perceives the referent of the thought [46]. Accordingly, we might 
express the function of perceptual consciousness appealed to here as follows. It takes 
perceptual information as input, and delivers as output a kind of sensitivity to reasons 
for thought and action which can inform a decision to act intentionally. 
From this perspective, reports are evidence of consciousness because they are a 
way of acting for the reasons consciousness makes available. But the function of 
perceptual consciousness is not just a function from perceptual information to 
reportability, or to anything that obviously requires cognitive access. By itself, the 
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function identified leaves it open whether cognitive access is required for the kind of 
sensitivity to reasons which can inform a decision to act intentionally, or just for the 
decision itself. So this is an example of a function of consciousness which, if it could be 
defended, might allow us to critically assess CH. 
A second set of obstacles to this approach lies in identifying suitable algorithms 
and physiological processes. To illustrate using the same example, it is unclear how the 
notion of an algorithm should be applied to a function which takes perceptual 
information as input, and delivers as output a different kind of sensitivity to that same 
information. Partly as a result, we are a long way from having evidence about whether 
the mechanisms of cognitive access, or instead earlier processes which provide input to 
cognitive access, such as those within visual cortex, are suitable to implement this 
function. 
However, it is worth noting that the problem here is not the famously hard one 
of explaining consciousness itself in physiological terms [13]. To identify a function of 
consciousness and physiological processes suitable to implement an algorithm for 
computing that function, we need not overcome our poor grasp of how physiological 
processes could explain the character of consciousness itself. In this respect, a broadly 
Marrian approach has a basic advantage over attempts to identify neural correlates of 
consciousness independently of its function—for example, over attempts to identify 
consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Nonetheless, as these brief remarks 
illustrate, such an approach to the empirical critical assessment of CH faces serious 
obstacles, and would require a challenging engagement with both philosophical and 
empirical problems. Perhaps that is what we should expect in an attempt to identify the 
mechanisms of consciousness.10 
 
 																																																								10	Work on this material was presented at meetings of the Association for the Scientific Study of 
Consciousness and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, the Oxford Mind Work 
in Progress Seminar, and a British Academy Newton Fund workshop at the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México. For helpful discussions, thanks to Ned Block, Michael Caie, 
Tony Cheng, Will Davies, Baruch Eitam, Stephen Fleming, Anil Gomes, Matthew Parrott, Ian 
Phillips, Philip Stratton-Lake, Miguel Ángel Sebastián, Ilja Sligte and Marius Usher. Thanks to 
two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
	 22	
References 
 
1. Block, N. 2007 Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and 
neuroscience. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 30, 481-548. 
2. Baars, B. 1988 A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
3. Dehaene, S, Changeux, J-P, Naccache, L, Sackur, J & Sergent, C. 2006 Conscious, 
preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
10(5), 204-11. 
4. Rosenthal, D. 2005 Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
5. Prinz, J. 2012 The Conscious Brain: How attention engenders experience. New York: OUP.  
6. Lamme, V. 2006 Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
10(11), 494-501. 
7. Posner, M. 1980 Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 32(1), 3-
25. 
8. Bronfman, Z, Brezis, N, Jacobson, H and Usher, M. 2014 We see more than we can report: 
‘cost free’ color phenomenality outside focal attention. Psychological Science 25(7), 1394-
1403. 
9. Stazicker, J. 2011 Attention, visual consciousness and indeterminacy. Mind & Language 
26(2), 156-184. 
10. Irvine, E. 2013 Measures of consciousness. Philosophy Compass 8(3): 285–297. 
11. Tsuchiya, N, Wilke, M, Frässle, S and Lamme, V. 2015 No-report paradigms: Extracting the 
true neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19(12), 757-770.  
12. Nagel, T. 1974 What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83, 435-456. 
13. Levine, J. 1983 Materialism and qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
64, 354-361. 
14. Kuffler, S. 1952 Neurons in the retina: organization, inhibition and excitation problems. 
Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 17, 281-292. 
15. Tye, M. 2006 Content, richness, and fineness of grain. In Gendler, T and Hawthorne, J 
(eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: OUP. 
16. Block, N. 2011 Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 15(12), 567-575. 
17. Block, N. 2014 Rich conscious perception outside focal attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
18(9), 445-447. 
18. Vandenbroucke, A, Sligte, I, Fahrenfort, J, Ambroziak, K and Lamme, V. 2012 Non-
attended representations are perceptual rather than unconscious in nature. PLoS One 7(11), 
e50042. 
19. Sergent, C. and Rees, G. 2007 Conscious access overflows overt report. Behavioral & Brain 
Sciences 30, 524. 
20. Phillips, I. 2011 Perception and iconic memory: what Sperling doesn’t show. Mind & 
Language 26(2), 381–411. 
21. Phillips, I. 2016 No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of 
consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 29(2), 236-249. 
22. Brown, R. 2011 The myth of phenomenological overflow. Consciousness & Cognition 21, 599-
604. 
23. Cohen, M. and Dennett, D. 2011 Consciousness cannot be separated from function. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences 15(8), 358-364. 
24. Háyek, A and Joyce, J. 2008 Confirmation. In Psillos, S and Curd, M (eds.), Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. 
25. Sperling, G. 1960 The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological 
Monographs: General & Applied 74(11, Whole No. 498), 1–29. 
26. Sligte, I, Scholte, H and Lamme, V. 2008 Are there multiple visual short-term memory 
stores? PLoS One 3(2), e1699. 
27. Landman, R, Spekreijse, H and Lamme, V. 2003 Large capacity storage of integrated objects 
before change blindness. Vision Research 43(2), 149–64. 
28. Gross, S and Flombaum, J. 2017 Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access? 
The challenge from probabilistic, hierarchical processes. Mind & Language 32(3), 358–391. 
29. Wu, W. 2014 Attention. New York: Routledge. 
30. Ling, S, Liu, T and Carrasco, M. 2009 How spatial and feature-based attention affect 
the gain and tuning of population responses. Vision Research 49, 1194–1204. 
31. Sergent, C, Wyart, V, Babo-Rebelo, M, Cohen, L, Naccache, L and Tallon-Baudry, C. 
2013 Cueing attention after the stimulus is gone can retrospectively trigger conscious 
perception. Current Biology 23(2): 150-155. 
32. Sligte, I, Scholte, H and Lamme, V. 2009 V4 activity predicts the strength of visual short-
	 23	
term memory representations. Journal of Neuroscience 29(23), 7432-7438. 
33. Crick, F and Koch, C. 1998 Consciousness and neuroscience. Cerebral Cortex 8, 97–107. 
34. Lau, H and Rosenthal, D. 2011 Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious 
awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(8), 365-73. 
35. Kanizsa, G. 1976 Subjective contours. Scientific American 234, 48–52. 
36. Kouider, S, De Gardelle, V, Sackur, J and Dupoux, E. 2010 How rich is consciousness? The 
partial awareness hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Science 14, 301–307. 
37. Harris, J, Schwarzkopf, D, Song, C, Bahrami, B and Rees, G. 2011 Contextual illusions 
reveal the limit of unconscious visual processing. Psychological Science 22, 399–405. 
38. Bayne, T. 2010 The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: OUP. 
39. Ma, W, Husain, M and Bays, P. 2014 Changing concepts of working memory. Nature 
Neuroscience 17, 347–56. 
40. Evans, G. 1982 The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
41. Spener, M. 2007 Expecting phenomenology. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 30, 526-527. 
42. Marr, D. 1982 Vision. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
43. Rosenthal, D. 2008 Consciousness and its function. Neuropsychologia 46: 829-840. 
44. Monti, M, Vanhaudenhuyse, A, Coleman, M, Boly, M, Pickard, J, Tshibanda, L, Owen, A 
and Laureys, S. 2010 Willful modulation of brain activity in disorders of consciousness. 
New England Journal of Medicine 362(7), 579-589. 
45. Anscombe, GEM. 1957 Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
46. Dickie, I. 2015 Perception and demonstratives. In Matthen, M., Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: OUP. 
 
 
